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ABSTRACT 
.· 
Despite the familiar and correct 
discl3imer that information theory 
(Shannon and Weaver, 1949) does not con-
cern the semantic level of communication, 
the technical definition of information 
nonetheless bears directly and impor-
tantly on the subject of meaning. 
Meaning, at least in one sense of the 
word, is the recognition of constraint 
and is based on isomorphism of struc-
ture. Constraint reduces information 
yet information is also the very ~ub- 1 
strate of meaning. Meaning is thus the 
union of the informative and the intel-
ligible (Moles, 1958), the reconcilia-
tion of this dialectical opposition 
being achievable in several different 
ways. 
It is commonly understood that 
"information" in the mathematical the-
ory of communication (Shannon and Weaver, 
1949) refers only to the technical as-
?ects of signal transmission and not at 
a~l to questions of meaning. To deal 
with such questions, Bar-Hillel and Car-
nap (1953, 1964) developed a semantic 
theory of information formally similar 
to ~hannon's theory but based upon a 
l?gical, as opposed to statistical, no-
tion of probability. The Shannon 
entropy expression, H = -! pJ. log p., 
. h J in t e semantic theory is used for 
the average uncertainty associated with 
a set of possible meanings, as compared 
in the technical theory, to the average' 
uncertainty associated with a set of 
(emit~ed or received) symbols. Both the 
technical and semantic theories are thus 
essentially theories of selection, 
But by virtue of this formal simi-
larity, the technical and semantic levels 
re~ain fully distinct and unbridgeable. 
This complete separability of levels pre-
~ludes a~y quantitative linkage between 
information and meaning, though meaning 
depends upon the receipt of information a~d if meaning is to be quantified, one' 
might ex9ect that its amount should be 
a f~nction ~f (and possibly vary mono-
tonically with) the amount of informa-
tion. The relationship, however, must 
be more complex since from a random 
sequence of symbols one gains maximum 
information, but no meaning. Indeed, 
Weaver remarked on his vague feeling 
that 
information and mean~ng may 
prove to be something like a 
pair of canonically conjugate 
variables in quantum theory 
. subject to some joint 
restriction that condemns a 
person to the sacrifice of the 
one as he insists on having 
much of the other • . 
(Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p 28) 
but gave no specific basis for such a 
complementarity. The purpose of this 
note is to pursue this suggestion fur-
ther and by doing so demonstrate a 
complex relationship between infor~ation, 
constraint, and meaning. 
Information, for Shannon and Weavec, 
is reduction in uncertainty i c -~u = 
uinitial - ufinal' If a definite messase 
is received, i.e., the final uncertain~·; 
is zero, then the information gained is. 
equal to the initial uncertainty. Mes-
sages from a source about which there is 
complete initial uncertaintv, i.e., a 
random source, carry maximum infoc~a:ion. 
Thus, for example, if a sequence of sym-
bols s 1 , s 2 , . sn is recei•1ed, one 
gains maximal information when receio" 
of sj in no way reduces the uncertai;ty 
of what sj+l (and succeeding symbols) 
will be. To the extent that the source 
is nonrandom and there exist cor.strain"s 
between symbols at different times, the 
information provided by the message is 
reduced (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; ~iller, 
1963) • 
Constraint reduces information. Yet 
strong constraint is oresent in natura! 
language, e.g., ir. the secuence of le:-
ters in words and of word~ in sentences. 
This constraint is normally referred ~o 
as redundancy; and for the English lan-
guage, redundancy is approximately 50% 
(Shannon and IYe;iver, 1949). This redun-
dancy muse be performing some useful 
function, since it reduces the informa-
tion content of messages from what is 
theoretically achievable. The fur.ction 
is normally assumed to be error correc-
tion: if part of the message is lost, 
redundancy enhances the ~ossibility that 
the receiver can reconstruct what was 
lost or ignore it. 
It is unlikely, however, that the 
function of error correction accounts 
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sufficiently for redundancy in lan-
guage. Consider an ideal communication 
situation where the message received is 
exactly the message sent. Error cor-
rection would not be necessary, so a 
redundancy-free language would seem to 
be ootimal, since a minimal number of 
symbols would be required for any mes-
sage. 
Yet such a language is hardly 
conceivable. Because of the complete 
absence of constraint between sequen-
tial symbols, a message will appear to 
be coming from a random source. How 
could it be understood? The message 
will be perceived as a unit without 
carts since there can be no basis to 
demarcate substrings in a string of 
symbols emitted from a random source. 
For parts to exist in some relation, 
some constraint must exist between them, 
which has by assumption been precluded. 
The meaning of such a message 
would have to be looked up in a (vast) 
reference table. This follows from 
the unitary character of every mes-
sage: each will be mappable onto a 
unique number with a unique meaning. 
(E.g., message #2,092,154 might be 
translated·as "The dog chased the 
cat.") Such a table would have to 
encompass all possible linguistic 
utterances, whose number is extremely 
large, indeed noncomputable. So a 
table cf this sort could not in fact 
be ?repared. One may object: why 
should it be necessary to translate 
the original message into a natural 
language utterance? Why cannot each 
message (say, "2,092,154") "point" 
directly to its meaning, i.e., to our 
ex?erience of the world received via 
the senses? 
This raises the central question: 
What is required for experience to have 
meaning, which can be the semantic con-
tent of a message? The answer has been 
clearly articulated by Ashby (1956). 
For experience to be comprehensible, 
some constraint must exist in the ele-
ments of experience. (Mathematically, 
constraint between two variables, say 
x and y, is defined set-theoretically 
(Wiener, 1917), as the joint occurrence 
of (x, y) in only a subset of the Car-
tesian product of the sets of x and y 
values). What can be understood is 
constraint, i.e., the order which we 
see or lp~rhaps) project onto the world. 
If what is intelli~ible in exper-
ience is constraint, it is natural that 
the means by which we represent or ex-
press experience should exhibit a 
corresvonding constraint. Constraint 
implies redundancy. Here, then, is a 
second explanation for redundancy in 
language. Constraint is a basis for 
meaning. The meaning of an utterance 
is based on a mapping between the con-
straint embodied in experience and the 
constraint represented in language. To 
be more precise: What is mapped are 
elements and the constraining relations 
between them. In language, the words 
are the elements; the nonarbitrary 
sequence of words in sentences, the con-
straints. (Words themselves are 
constrained forms of smaller units, and 
sentences are elements in larger units, 
but we shall here ignore these other 
levels of language.) Words map onto 
different "chunked" aspects of our ex?e:-
ience 1 sentences map onto the relations 
we perceive between these chunked as-
pects. There are thus at least two 
senses of "meaning": meaning l • the ma?-
ping of one element onto another, and · 
meaning 2 , the mapping of a relation (constraint) onto a relation (in addi-
tion to a mapping of elements onto 
elements). 
The first sense of "meaning" is 
fairly simole, namelv the relation of 
symbol and
0
referent,
0
e.g., the relatior. 
of the word "dog" to the familiar four-
legged creature referred to. It is in 
this sense of meaning that "2,092,154" 
can mean "The dog chased the cat." Only 
this type of meaning is possible in a 
language with no redundancy; this also 
resembles Bar-Hillel and Carna?'s notion 
of meaning as involving a selection from 
a set of possibilities. 
The second sense of "meaning" in-
cludes the first as a component, b~t is 
more com?lex. Meaning2 is the isomor-
phism of two or more structures, where 
"structure" is a set of elements organ-
ized by some constraint. If the 
constraint in a received message is 
sufficiently isomorphic to some refer-
ence constraint, the former is taken to 
"mean" the latter. The reference con-
straint can be internal, e.g., some 
mental representation of past experience, 
or external; and the two structures can 
be given either in the same or in dif-
ferent modes of representation. Meaning 2 
arises from the recognition of con-
straint. 
Constraint can be quantitativel; 
assessed as information-theoretic 
"transmission," which we will write as 
"c." For a message consisting of n sym-
c "' ~ u ( s.) j J 
• Snr 
. s ) 
n 
The u's represent initial uncer~ainties; 
the final uncertainties are zero. 
u(s 1 , s 2 , . sn) is thus the informa-
tion gained, i, upon receipt of the 
message. ~ u(sj) is the maximum infor-
J 
mation which could ?OSsibly have been 
gained, were there no redundancy in the 
message, and is a constant, call it K, 
for all fixed length messages. Thus, 
c + i = K 
i.e., the sum of the amount of con-
straint and the amount of information 
is constant. Thus redundancy, defined 
as g ,is necessary, not merely for 
I< 
error-correction, but more fundamentally 
for structure, from which there arises 
the possibility of meaning 2• 
One could then conceivably express 
the dependence of meaning upon constraint 
in terms of a monotonic dependence of 
the quantity of the former upon the 
quantity of the latter, i.e., by m..Cc. 
Given i + c = K, here is a clear basis 
for Weaver's idea of information and 
meaning being "subject to ~he sacrifice 
of one ..• {from} •.• having much 
of the other," quoted earlier. 
aut the matter is more complex and 
perhaps even paradoxical. Meaning 2, 
being based on an isomorphism of struc-
ture, requires that a message embody 
constraint. Constraint reduces infor-
mation. Yet meaning presupposes and 
depends upon the receipt of informa-
ation: and if the meaning of a message 
could be quantified, it might be ex-
pected also to vary monotonically with 
the message's information content. A 
message with little information cannot 
support much structure and thus much 
meaning. Hence constraint is necessary 
for meaning, yet also, as it were, 
undermines (reduces) it. 
This analysis is not restricted to 
language, but applies to all forms of 
communication. Information and con-
straint must similarly be balanced in 
the visual arts, in music, etc. Too 
much information becomes chaos, which 
has no meaning. Too much constraint 
is boring because, however "meaningful'' 
the communication is, it conveys too 
little information. 
This dialectical tension has been 
eloquently and extensively discussed 
by Moles (1958) who notes the funda-
mental opposition in all forms of 
communication between what is intelli-
gible and what is informative. This 
idea serves as the foundation for 
Moles' rich and deep analysis of the 
relationship between information theory 
and aesthetic perception, this analysis 
showing conclusively that, desoite the 
oft-cited and necessary disclaimer that 
Shannon's theory does not explicitly 
deal with meaning (which, strictly 
speaking, is correct), the technical 
theory nonetheless bears very con-
siderably--and directly--on this 
important subject. 
There are at least three ways by 
which tension between variety (informa-
tion) and constraint can be satisfactor-
ily resolved. In the first, a compromise 
or balance is reached between the two 
conflictin9 needs. In the second, the 
extremes are not subjected to compromise 
but are superposed. The message is 
divided into two parts, one embodying 
extreme constraint, the other embodying 
extreme variety, so that the goals are 
met separately. In the third, th;;re is 
also no compromise but the conflicting 
needs for variety and constraint are 
satisfied sequentially in time, either 
once or repeatedly. 
One might represent quantitatively 
the strategy of com?romise. Let m equal 
the "amount" of meaning 2 in a message. 
If, from one point of view, m should 
vary directly with the amount of con-
straint in a message and yet, from 
another perspective, it should vary di 
rectly with the amount of information 
in a message, one might consider the 
possibility of writing m = 5ic, where E 
is some constant. Since i + c = K, 
maximum m is obtained when i = c = K, 
2 
i.e., when redundancy is 50%. This, we 
recall, is the redundancy of English, 
and the comparable figure for French is 
45\ (Moles, 1953); presumably ::he re-
dundancies of other languages tend to 
be closer to this value rather than tQ 
either extreme of O or 100\. This anal-
ysis is suggestive as a starting point 
for more intensive study, but should not 
yet be take~ too seriously. 
Another ouantitative illustration 
can be given ior this idea of compcomise. 
The analysis (Voss and Clark, 1975, 
1978; see also Gardner, 1978) of the 
sound spectra of musical works {of 
greatly varying styles--from Bach and 
Beethoven to the Beatles) reveals cor-
relations of strength inversely 
proportional to frequency; that is, 
music resembles what physicists call l/f 
noise. Such correlations lie interme-
diate between white noise, whose 
frequency spectrum is flat and which 
corresponds to the complete absence of 
order, and Brownian noise, which is more 
ordered and has correlations varying 
inversely with the sguare of the fre-
quency. The l/f 1 spectrum is 
"intermediate" between 1/fo and l/f 2 
spectra: music represents a compromise 
between high information (white noise) 
and moderate constraint (Brownian noise). 
To avoid the implication that there 
is some specific optimal balance of in-
formation and constraint, it might be 
preferable to speak of a range 
of compromise values.or a "plateau of 
meaning" between the extremes of 
order (maximum constraint) and chaos 
(maximum information) as shown in 
Figure 1. (The plateau imagery is 
adapted from Miller, 1971; Hardin, 
196 3.) 
plateau of meaning 
:naximum 
constraint 
Figure L 
maximum 
information 
One might also fold the hori-
zontal axis over, giving the 
representation of Figure 2: meaning 
now increases monotonically in one 
direction. 
minimal meaning 
due to 
insufficient 
constraint 
minimal meaning 
due to 
insufficient 
information 
Figure 2. 
maximal 
meaning 
Or, one might employ catastrophe-
theoretic imagery (Thom, 1974). Using 
the dual of the cusp catastrophe (where 
the region inside the bifurcation set 
corresponds to a stable equilibrium 
surface), we have the representation of 
Figure 3. 
constraint 
region of 
effective 
communication 
information 
Figure 3. Constraint and information 
treated as independent variables (K 
is allowed to vary). 
With the simple schema of Figure 1, 
one might interpret the aim of certain 
movements in the arts as the widening of 
this plateau in the direction of one or 
the other extremes, Minimal art (typi-
fied, say, by some monochromatic 
painting, in its most extreme manifesta-
tion by. a white on white canvas) is an 
extension in the direction of maximal 
constraint. The "randomness• of some of 
the creations of Jackson Pollock or John 
Cage are attempts to extend the domain 
of effective communication in the oppo-
site direction, towards maximal varietv. 
Cage has also experimented at the other 
extreme, i.e., with minimal forms having 
extreme order. 
In the face of overly chaotic or 
constrained forms, a viewer/listener ma/ 
be forced to become aware of more--or 
new fprms of--constraint or variety than 
was initially apparent. The first im-
pression of a work of art or music as 
being too chaotic or too ordered may 
really be the product of artistic tra-
dition, social convention, and/or 
personal habit. 
Artistic ex?eriments probing the 
meaningful limits of order or chaos ~~y 
also depend for their success U?on a 
different mechanism. Such works oper-
ate at a meta-level of communication, 
saying, in effect: this is art desoi~e 
its extreme randomness, or despite lts 
extreme order. The "frame message" of 
the work (Hofstadter, 1978), the pri-
mary communication of any message that 
it is in fact a message, guarantees at 
least a certain kind of meaning, irre-
spective of content. What is exhioited 
in museums, performed on stages, etc 
or what is don~ by "artists," is defined 
and usually accepted (sometimes reluc-
tantly) as art. 
As Hofstadter has pointed out, such 
communications require, for their appre-
ciation, familiarity with the history and 
current manifestations of the ?articular 
art form. This meaning is not internal, 
i.e., deriving from some constraint uoon 
variety, but external. It is neither· 
meaning 1 (a label or map?ing invoked oy 
some act of selecti,n), nor meaning 2 (an 
isomorphism of constraint), but a third 
alternative: the communication in its 
entirety is an element in a larger sys-
tem, which consists of other elements 
constrained by a higher level relation. 
Meaning 3 is defined in terms of context. 
To put it simply: meaning 2 is based on 
"structure," the internal order present 
in a system, while meaning 3 is oased on 
"function• or "history,• the external or-
der in which it participates, whether 
synchronic or diachronic. The three 
senses of meaning are summarized diagram-
matically in Figure 4. 
R 
r 
---
meanin92 
Figure 4. uThree Senses of Meaning.• Elements 
e 1 , e 2 , and e 3 are organized (constrained) by 
relation r, to form system A. Mean1ng 2 is the 
isomorphism of system A with some other syst~m, 
8. Meaning 1 is a simpler concept, referring to 
the mapping of a structureless element, say e 2 , 
onto some other element, say 9. System A can 
also act as an element, E1 , in a higher level 
system constrained by relation R. T~e entire 
system can have a meanin9 3 by virtue of the 
relation R of E1 to other ele~ents, E2 , E3 , and E4. 
8 
In terms of either meaning 1 or 
meaning 3, a message is treated as a 
unit. (For meaning 1 the message is 
structureless, while for meanin9 3 it 
may have some internal order which 
underlies its relations to other units.) 
For both meaning 1 and meanin9 3 , there-
T~e second means ~Y whic~ the need Ecr 
both variety and constraint may be 
reconciled, namely the partioning of a 
message in two, is illustrated by th~ 
DHA molecule which f~lfills Schrodin;er's 
scientific prophecy tnat t~e physical 
substrate of genetic ~emory should be 
an •aperiodic crystal." DNA is sucn a 
union of opposites: ~aximal con~train: 
is embodied in the crystalline, i.e., 
perfectly periodic, sugar-phosphate 
backbone of each strand of the molecule; 
maximal information is embodied in the 
aperiodicity, i.e., irregular sequence, 
of bases attached to ~ne sugars (Fi;uc~ 
fore, the preceding discussion of 
com~lementarity of information and 
constraint is irrelevant; such consi-
derations ap?ly only to meaning 2 . 
"aperiodic __,. 
crystal" -~ 
5) • 
Figure 5. Symbolic representation of one (st:etched-
out) strand of DNA illustrating Schrodinger's idea of 
an aperiodic crystal. (S = sugar, P ~ phosphate, 
s1 , 2 , 3 , 4 • bases ~ adenine, thymine, cytosine, guanine.) 
•. 
- .. 
Normally the ONA message is said to 
reaiide in the base sequence, that is, only 
the aperiodic part, which detetmines the 
amino acid sequence in proteins. (This is 
what Hofstadter terms an "inner message.") 
Yet DNA must a,+so "communicate" how it is 
to be read, its decoding mechanismr that 
is, it must provide for its interaction 
~ith a variety of enzymes. (Hofstadter 
calls the S?ecif ication of decoding pro-
cedures the ''outer message.") A great 
proportion (but not all) of tbis message 
is located in the spatial structure and 
chemical properties of the sugar-phosphate 
back~one. In this case, then, the inner 
message embodies hi9h information and the 
outer message embodies high constraint, 
though both components of the message are 
read simultaneously. 
The third way by which the tension 
between variety and constraint may be 
resolved is to communicate '~ message which 
is first perceived as havin9 high infor-
mation but whose structure is soon there-
after cognized. This is succinctly 
summarized in the expressive statement of 
Gr•y (19741: "Meaning is the digestion of 
newness into sameness." Newness is infor-
mation: sameness is isomor?hism of 
structure. 
for example, up to the end of a good 
detective or mystery story there will ap-
pear to be no order (in the explicit 
clues, in the characters of the protago-
nists, etc), but when the mystery is 
finally revealed, the pieces fall into 
place. What seemed to be a situation of 
maximum chaos is revealed to be a situa-
tion of maximum order. It is not a 
compromise that is reached between infor-
mation and constraint. Rather, both 
e~tremes are superposed, but sequentially. 
Here, too, the frame message (include in 
this the specification of genre) is 
essential. The reader can bear the mul-
tiplicity of yet unrelated facts because 
the frame message guarantees the exis-
tence of some unifying order. Either it 
can be figured out by the reader--this is 
t~e challenge 9osed by this 9enM--or it 
will finally be revealed in the end, 
This means of reconciling the con-
~rary needs ~f information and constraint 
is not restricted to the detective or 
mystery story, but is a general feature of 
the novel and applies to masterpieces as 
well as potboilers. All this refers·to 
t~e single level of plot, but such dialec-
tical tensions and reconciliations exist 
at multiple structural levels in lit-
era~y works, as well as in other artistic 
media. (See, e.g ••. Moles, 1958, Chapter 
Vt, and the discussion of ~ardner, 1978, 
of the work of Voss and the theory of f rac-
tals of Benott Mandelbrot.} 
Another example of this general 
schema is the placing of the verb in 
German at the end of sentences; antici-
pation and suspense enhance the infor• 
mational richness of the message when 
t:he key to its meaning is finally de-
1 i vered. Here, too, the frame message 
("This is a sentence in German") sus-
tains the listener by providing a guar-
antee of the eventual comprehensibility 
of the utterance. 
Tnis approach of reconciling the 
conflicting needs of information and 
constraint can also be varied by pco-
ceeding, not from information to 
constraint, but in the reverse direc-
tion. Rather than being derived from 
the recognition of order in apparent 
disorder, meaning may be based u~on the 
introduction of new variety, and hence 
imperfection, into existing constra·int. 
In imperfection there is novelty 
and thus information. This information 
has meaning since it occurs in the con-
text of a recognized constraint. More-
over, the imperfection not only creates 
novelty but actual tension, which sus-
tains interest in the unfolding, spatial 
and/or temporal, of the work. But the 
matter does not stop here. The tension 
must be resolved, i.e., the imperfectio~ 
removed, typically by being perceived as 
lawful, i.e., the reflectior. of a "hi~;:i­
er• (more encompassing) ordering prin-
ciple. This means of reconciling the 
two needs of com~unication can be linkec 
to the earlier approach discussed above: 
One proceeds to order either fcom dis-
order or from the distortion or 
imperfection in some prior ordec. Or 
there may be some genuine, if icregular, 
alternacion of banality and original-
ity (Moles, l9S8). 
In summary, then, while Shannon's 
information theory does. not explicitly 
speak of meaning, the quantitative mea-
sure of information introduced by that 
theory cannot be dissociated fcom dis-
cussions of the semantic level of 
communication. "Information" and "mean-
ing" are, rather, ultimately linked, via 
the universal dialectical complementar-
ity of information and constraint. The 
tension produced by this complementari:1 
can be resolved in a number of al~erna­
tive ~ays, the consideration of which 
gives rise to several cifferent meanings 
of "meaning." 
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